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CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS: DUBIOUS INSTRUMENTS
Charles W. Murdock

*

Introduction
The past thirty to forty years have witnessed fundamental changes in the nature of
our economy, arguably not for the better. At one time, financial institutions were
intermediaries; they allocated capital among competing users to ensure the most efficient
use of capital. Today, financial institutions are consumers of capital more than allocators
of capital. From 1994 to 2009, the assets of the six largest banks in the U.S. grew from
14.8% of gross domestic product (GDP) to 62.1% of GDP.1 Forty years ago, a major
trading day on the New York Stock Exchange involved twenty million shares being
traded.2 In the past three years, daily trading volume has generally ranged from one
billion to two billion shares and, at times, has exceeded four billion shares.3 This increase
is due, at least in part, to the fact that institutions have gone from being investors to being
traders. Portfolios are turned over, not every seven years, but every seven months.4
*

Charles W. Murdock is currently a professor of law at Loyola University Chicago School of Law,
where he formerly served as Dean. From 1982 to 1985, he was the Deputy Attorney General for Illinois.
Prior to that, he served as a consultant to the Securities and Exchange Commission. He is also the author
of a two-volume treatise on Illinois business law.
1
Angie Drobnic Holan, Six Largest Banks Getting Bigger, Brown Said, POLITIFACT (Apr. 27, 2010),
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2010/apr/27/sherrod-brown/six-largest-banks-gettingbigger-brown-said/ (citing Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia data).
2
Daily Share Volume in NYSE Listed Issues from 1970 through 1979, NYSE EURONEXT,
http://www.nyse.com/marketinfo/stats/vol70-79.dat (last visited Mar. 25, 2013).
3
Daily NYSE Group Volume in NYSE Listed, 2010–Current, NYSE EURONEXT,
http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer_edition.asp?mode=table&key=3141&category=3
(last visited Mar. 25, 2013).
4
Dominic Barton, Capitalism for the Long Term, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2011, at 85, 87 (“In the
1970s the average holding period for U.S. equities was about seven years.”). See also John C. Bogle,
Restoring
Faith
in
Financial
Markets,
WALL
S T.
J.
(Jan.
18,
2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703436504574640523013840290.html (“[T]he folly of
short-term speculation has replaced the wisdom of long-term investing as the star of capitalism. A rent-astock system has replaced the earlier own-a-stock system.”).
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Derivatives and other “innovative” financial instruments such as collateralized
debt obligations (CDOs) and synthetic CDOs were largely responsible for the collapse of
the economy in 2008.5 The development of these instruments has also contributed to
increased trading activity. Prior to 2000, derivatives were a minor factor in the economy.
In June 2000, the notional volume of derivatives was $94 trillion.6 By June 2011,
derivative volume had risen to $706.884 trillion, before falling back to $638.928 trillion
in June 2012.7 This is an eight-fold to nine-fold increase in such volume. Although
correlation certainly does not imply causation, it is fairly clear that the economy
performed far better in the late 1990s.
The Faulty Rationale of Credit Default Swaps
In a global economy, there are understandable rationales for derivatives such as
foreign exchange contracts.8 A party to a contract in one country who transacts with a
party in another country may not want to take the risk of currency fluctuations. Similarly,
with respect to interest rate contracts,9 a person holding a contract with a variable rate
might prefer the security of a fixed rate return. However, there is little justification for the
existence of credit default swaps (CDSs),10 and particularly for “naked” CDSs. The
financial industry is quick to defend CDSs on the basis that they reduce risk; naked
default swaps are justified on the basis that they provide liquidity and price discovery.11
These assertions are supposedly self-evident but there is another side to the story.
Consider a classic example of how CDSs reduce risk. A customer requests very
substantial financing from her bank. The bank wishes to please its customer, but does not
want to assume a large credit risk. With the advent of CDSs, the bank can purchase
protection to reduce its overall risk exposure. In the past, the bank in question could have
5

See Charles W. Murdock, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: What
Caused the Financial Crisis and Will Dodd-Frank Prevent Future Crises?, 64 S.M.U. L. REV. 1243
(2011). A recent comment by George Osborne, Britain’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, is equally
applicable to the United States: “Irresponsible behavior was rewarded, failure was bailed out, and the
innocent—people who have nothing whatsoever to do with the banks—suffered.” Mark Scott, Plan Could
Allow Forced Splits of British Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2013, at B4, available at
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/04/osborne-promises-more-regulatory-power-to-split-up-bigbanks/.
6
See Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, The Global OTC Derivatives Market Continues to
Grow (Nov. 13, 2000), http://www.bis.org/press/p001113.htm.
7
See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW STATISTICAL ANNEX A141 tbl.19
(Dec. 2012), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qa1212.pdf.
8
In June 2012, foreign exchange contracts had a notional value of $66.645 trillion. Id.
9
In June 2012, interest rate contracts had a notional value of $494.018 trillion. Id.
10
In June 2012, credit default swaps had a notional value of $26.931 trillion. Id.
11
See Dave Mason, The Senator Has No Clothes: Why a Ban on “Naked” Credit Default Swaps Is
Ill-Advised
and
Impractical,
HERITAGE
FOUNDATION
(May
5,
2010),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/05/the-senator-has-no-clothes-why-a-ban-on-naked-creditdefault-swaps-is-ill-advised-and-impractical.
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accomplished the same objective by putting together a syndicated loan or a consortium of
banks. While this continues to be a possibility, advocates of CDSs would argue their
approach is faster and more efficient. There are, however, many tradeoffs to speed and
efficiency. One such opportunity cost is diligence.12 The recent history of the banking
industry epitomizes a lack of due diligence.13
An additional concern is the difficulty in adequately pricing CDSs. Since each
transaction is unique, there is a dearth of market information about each particular
transaction. Reference could be made to the general default swap market, but such
information is no more accurate than that which could be obtained from the bond or other
market. Where there is a market for the underlying bonds and CDSs, supposedly the CDS
market leads the cash bond market in price discovery. But, as Richard Portes has pointed
out, “‘leadership’ may be the result not of better information, but of the effect of CDS
prices on the perceived creditworthiness of the issuer.”14 This result obtains because a
small group of firms dominates the derivatives market,15 thereby raising questions about
pricing efficiency. Moreover, studies from the European Union (EU) suggest that
speculation in CDSs may, at least in the short run, lead to mispricing.16
Finally, there is a question of how much liquidity exists in a thin market.
JPMorgan Chase was supposedly expert in managing risk. Thus, it came as a shock when
it announced that its chief investment office (CIO) had lost $2 billion in trading.17 As a
further surprise, it next reported a $4.4 billion loss.18 Its own estimate rose to almost $6
12

According to Monish Pabrai, who runs a $500 million fund, when you see what looks like a good
deal, “[y]ou go into greed mode.” ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: HOW TO GET THINGS
RIGHT 163 (2010). According to neuroscientists, making money stimulates the same primitive reward
circuits in the brain as cocaine. Id. Consequently, Pabrai asserts that this is when it is critical to focus on a
systematic approach to dispassionate analysis, avoiding both irrational exuberance and irrational panic;
otherwise, “[y]ou get seduced. You start cutting corners.” See id. at 164.
13
See Murdock, supra note 5, at 1271–81, 1287–1301. Keith Johnson, the former President of
Washington Mutual’s Long Beach Mortgage testified before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Committee that
“[s]everal of these factories were originating, packaging, securitizing and selling at the rate of $1 billion a
day. The quality control process failed at a variety of stages during the manufacturing, distribution and
on-going servicing.” Id. at 1273.
14
Richard
Portes,
Ban
Naked
CDS,
EUROINTELLIGENCE
(Mar.
18,
2010),
http://www.eurointelligence.com/news-details/article/ban-naked
cds.html?cHash=8d1cdb3c68fcffb16fd8c0b1c0ad10f3.
15
See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC’S QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK
TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES FOURTH QUARTER 2011 11, available at
http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/trading/derivatives/dq411.pdf.
16
See infra text accompanying note 31.
17
See Stephen Gandel, JPMorgan’s Trading Debacle: Why $2 Billion Is Just the Start, CNNMONEY
(May 13, 2012), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/05/11/jpmorgan-2-billion-just-start/.
18
Dawn Kopecki & Michael J. Moore, JPMorgan’s $4.4 Billion CIO Loss Drives Profit Down 9%,
BLOOMBERG (July 13, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-13/jpmorgan-s-4-4-billion-cioloss-drives-profit-down-9-percent.html.
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billion and there was speculation that it could go as high as $9 billion.19 This dramatic
increase was caused, at least in part, because of the difficulty that JPMorgan was having
in unwinding its positions.20
An Introduction to Naked Credit Default Swaps
While there are issues generally with regard to covered CDSs, these are magnified
when considering naked CDSs.21 With covered CDSs, even though the buyer of
protection has an interest in the underlying obligation, she faces a moral hazard problem.
This problem arises because the holder of the obligation with respect to which protection
is sought has, or at least should have, an informational advantage over the party
furnishing protection and thus could take advantage of the person providing protection. It
is the holder of the instrument who should be responsible for due diligence. Compared to
the party furnishing protection, the holder has the relationship, the access, and the
leverage to properly assess credit risk. Thus, to use a gambling analogy, CDSs are like
gambling with loaded dice since the buyer of protection has better information than the
provider of protection.
Despite the exacerbated moral hazard issues engendered by CDSs, they are
permitted because the financial industry lobbied to ensure CDSs would not be treated as
insurance under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.22 If
they were treated as insurance, the purchaser would need to have an insurable interest in
the subject of insurance.23 Since holders of naked CDSs have not extended credit to the
debtor, they have no insurable interest. As an example, when homeowners buy protection
against their house burning down, it is in their best interest that their house does not burn
down. Similarly, in a covered CDS, the buyer would prefer that the debt be repaid and
purchases insurance to protect against an event that the buyer of protection does not want
19

See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Susanne Craig, JPMorgan Trading Loss May Reach $9 Billion,
N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/28/jpmorgan-trading-loss-may-reach9-billion/.
20
See Gandel, supra note 17. See also Maureen Farrell, JPMorgan Chase Loss Only Going to Get
Worse, CNNMONEY (May 20, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/18/markets/jpmorganloss/index.htm (“As soon as it becomes clear that JPMorgan Chase is unwinding its position, it will be
obvious to players on every major trading desk. Hedge funds will immediately start piling into that index
and buying protection, driving up the bank's losses.”).
21
A “covered CDS” refers to a CDS in which the purchaser of protection has a creditor interest in the
underlying obligation while with a “naked CDS,” the purchaser of protection does not have a creditor
interest in the underlying obligation.
22
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 722(b), 124
Stat. 1376, 1673 (2010).
23
See Parliament & Council Regulation 236/2012, Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit
Default Swaps, 2012 O.J. (L 86) 3 (EU) (“Sovereign credit default swaps should be based on the
insurable interest principle whilst recognising that there can be interests in a sovereign issuer other than
bond ownership.”).
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to occur; namely, the debtor’s default. Conversely, in a naked CDS, the “investor” who
purchases protection wants the credit default to occur in order to get paid. Otherwise, the
“premiums” that the purchaser of protection pays would be wasted.24
The moral hazard in this latter situation is illustrated by the Abacus 2007-AC1
synthetic CDO that Goldman Sachs assembled at the instance of Paulson & Co.
(Paulson), which wanted to bet against the housing market.25 In marketing the CDO to
investors, Goldman Sachs failed to disclose that Paulson participated in choosing the
mortgage-based securities against which the investors would provide protection. It was in
Paulson’s interest to choose securities that were likely to default so that the parties on the
other side of the transaction, who were providing protection, would pay the firm billions
of dollars upon default. Goldman Sachs initially argued that Paulson’s role was not
material, and thus the failure to disclose was not fraudulent, since any seller of protection
of necessity must recognize that there is a counterparty on the other side, who is buying
protection with an expectation of default.26 Nevertheless, Goldman Sachs settled with the
Securities and Exchange Commission and paid a $550 million fine.27
Regulation of Naked Credit Default Swaps
While Congress rejected a proposal by Senator Dorgan (D-ND) to ban naked
CDSs, a proposal heavily criticized in this country,29 last year the EU adopted such a
ban on sovereign debt.30 This regulation was prompted by studies indicating that short
selling and CDSs enabled speculators to distort the creditworthiness of some nations.31 A
28

24

For a history of the evolution from covered CDSs to naked CDSs and the economics of naked
CDSs, see Richard R. Zabel, Credit Default Swaps: From Protection to Speculation, ROBINS, KAPLAN,
MILLER & CIRESI L.L.P. (Sept. 2008), http://www.rkmc.com/publications/articles/credit-default-swapsfrom-protection-to-speculation.
25
See SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
26
See Liz Moyer, Goldman: In 2006, Paulson Was a Nobody, FORBES.COM (Apr. 21, 2010),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/streettalk/2010/04/21/goldman-in-2006-paulson-was-a-nobody/.
27
Press Release, SEC, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to
Subprime Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm.
28
See Ronald D. Orol, Senate Rejects Ban of Naked Credit Default Swaps, MARKETWATCH (May 18,
2010),
http://articles.marketwatch.com/2010-05-18/markets/30711928_1_credit-default-swaps-bankreform-end-debate.
29
See Mason, supra note 11. The author suggests that not just creditors of a corporation, but also
suppliers and landlords, may need CDS protection. Id. However, it seems unlikely that an empirical study
of suppliers and landlords would find many who were participants in the CDS market.
30
See Parliament & Council Regulation 236/2012, Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit
Default Swaps, 2012 O.J. (L 86) 10–14 (EU). See also Noam Noked, Europe Restricts “Naked” Credit
Default Swaps and Short Sales, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 27, 2011),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/12/27/europe-restricts-naked-credit-default-swaps-and-shortsales/.
31
See, e.g., Catherine Bruneau et al., Is the European Sovereign Crisis Self-Fulfilling? Empirical
Evidence About the Drivers of Market Sentiments (July 24, 2012) (working paper),
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European economics professor summarized the concern as follows:
The rise in sovereign and banking CDSs premia changes the market’s
expectations about the country’s default probability. Market participants
sell bonds and banking stocks in the belief that default risk is greater. The
market shifts to a pessimistic equilibrium and, in fact, sovereign default
becomes more likely. Accounting for shifts in market sentiment explains
the sudden eruption of the crisis in countries like Portugal or Spain, where
the fundamentals have deteriorated only progressively.32
Professor Delatte was critical of the regulation, which excluded banking CDSs and
exempted market makers, because it did not go far enough.33 She noted that large dealers
in CDSs, such as JPMorgan, dominate the market.34 Similarly, Richard Portes has argued
for a broad ban on naked CDSs.35
On the other hand, not all economists favor banning naked CDSs.36 A paper by
Camera and Capponi argues that a ban on CDSs decreases liquidity and does not
necessarily lower credit spreads in a well functioning market.37 These arguments
overlook a fundamental question: when is the market well functioning and when is it
dominated by speculation or manipulation? Professor Portes has offered the following
scenario:
Naked CDS, as a speculative instrument, may be a key link in a vicious
chain. Buy CDS low, push down the underlying (e.g., short it), and take a
profit from both. Meanwhile, the rise in CDS prices will raise the cost of
funding of the reference entity—it normally cannot issue at a rate that
won’t cover the cost of insuring the exposure. That will harm its fiscal or
cash flow position. Then there will be more bets on default, or at least on a
further rise in the CDS price. If market participants believe that others will
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2116240.
32
Anne-Laure Delatte, The European Ban on Naked Sovereign Credit Default Swaps: A Fake Good
Idea, VOX (July 23, 2012), http://www.voxeu.org/article/european-ban-naked-sovereign-credit-defaultswaps-fake-good-idea.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Richard Portes, Credit Default Swaps: Useful, Misleading, Dangerous?, VOX (Apr. 30, 2012),
http://www.voxeu.org/article/credit-default-swaps-useful-misleading-dangerous. See also Portes, supra
note 14.
36
See Jonathon Boyd, No Evidence to Support EU Ban on Naked CDS, INVESTMENT EUROPE (Feb.
14, 2013), http://www.investmenteurope.net/investment-europe/news/2244090/no-evidence-to-supporteu-ban-on-naked-cds-forum. See also Carlos Tavares, The CDS-Bond Spreads Debates Through the Lens
of the Regulator, VOX (Jan. 12, 2011), http://www.voxeu.org/article/under-regulator-s-microscope-creditdefault-swaps.
37
Gabriele Camera & Agostino Capponi, Liquidity Impact of a Ban on Naked Credit-Default Swaps
(Sept.
10,
2012)
(working
paper),
available
at
https://engineering.purdue.edu/Capponi/DynamicsNakedCDS_Sep10.pdf.
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bet similarly, then we have the equivalent of a ‘run’. And the downward
spiral is amplified by the credit rating agencies, which follow rather than
lead. There is clearly an incentive for coordinated manipulation, and
anyone familiar with the markets can cite examples which look very much
like this.38
The foregoing leads us into another problematic aspect of CDSs. The alleged fraud
of Goldman Sachs has already been discussed39 and Portes suggests the possibility of
manipulation.40 Consider insider trading and manipulation. The federal government faces
substantial difficulties in proving insider trading cases, despite the fact that structurally
they are fairly simple.41 For the government to bring a stock manipulation case is
extremely rare since manipulation usually involves multiple transactions, often
encompassing more than one market, thereby exacerbating the problems of proof and
making it more difficult to explain the case to the ordinary person. The ease of
manipulation and the difficulty of proving it increase as the security interacts with more
markets. The naked CDS market further adds to this complexity.
The London Whale episode at JPMorgan42 demonstrates another dark side of
43
CDSs: how capital is diverted from productive uses to speculation. These trading losses
occurred in the CIO, which supposedly manages excess cash and which should be
conservatively run. Instead, Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan, turned the office into a
profit center. In 2009 and 2010, the CIO made a total profit of almost $8 billion.44
Hedging, which seeks protection against loss, should be a loss center, not a profit center.
Financial statements from the second quarter of 2012 also showed that deposits exceeded
38

Portes, supra note 14.
See supra text accompanying notes 21–27.
40
See Portes, supra note 35.
41
The notion is straightforward: someone trades ahead of the market based upon non-public
information.
42
See supra text accompanying notes 17–20.
43
JPMorgan invested not only in CDSs but also in credit indices and credit index tranches. A credit
index is a more complicated form of credit derivative in which the index references a basket of selected
credit instruments, typically credit default swaps or similar credit instruments. See U.S. SENATE
PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF
DERIVATIVES
RISKS
AND
ABUSES
29–34
(Mar.
15,
2013),
available
at
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/reports. JPMorgan had asserted that its
Synthetic Credit Portfolio operated as a hedge, meaning that they were “covered CDSs.” However, the
Subcommittee investigation revealed that JPMorgan had “failed to identify the assets or portfolios being
hedged, test the size and effectiveness of the alleged hedging activity, or show how the SCP lowered
rather than increased bank risk.” Id. at 15. In addition, the very fact that it was named the Synthetic Credit
Portfolio shows that JPMorgan recognized that it did not hold a creditors interest in the underlying
securities.
44
See JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., PRESENTATION SLIDES ON 2012 SECOND QUARTER FINANCIAL
RESULTS 14 (July 13, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000001961712000248/jpmc2q12exhibit992.htm.
39
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loans by $423 billion.45 Where is this excess found? It can be found in the CIO, where the
funds are apparently used not just for speculation but also for deception. JPMorgan’s 8-K
report, in revising earnings, stated:
The restatement results from information that has recently come to
the Firm’s attention in connection with management’s internal review of
activities related to CIO’s synthetic credit portfolio . . .
However, the recently discovered information raises questions about
the integrity of the trader marks, and suggests that certain individuals may
have been seeking to avoid showing the full amount of the losses being
incurred in the portfolio during the first quarter. As a result, the Firm is no
longer confident that the trader marks used to prepare the Firm’s reported
first quarter results (although within the established thresholds) reflect good
faith estimates of fair value at quarter end.46
The primary purpose of a bank is to make loans, not speculate. However, Jamie
Dimon still asserts that the CIO London Whale transactions were hedging, not
speculating transactions.47 The impact of CDSs on the economy as a whole does not
receive sufficient attention when discussing CDSs. This issue is clearly implicated in the
activities of JPMorgan’s CIO operation. Institutions are no longer investors, but rather
traders.48 While trading may create wealth for certain few, it does not create value for the
general economy. Both homeowners and small businesses are in need of additional
credit.49 To the extent the capital is devoted to trading, it is unavailable for growth
producing investment.50 People are better off fixing up their homes, and businesses are
better off investing in new equipment, than going to Las Vegas and gambling. The same
holds true in the financial realm. But, as discussed earlier, the lure of the fast buck is
irresistible.

45

Id. at 24 (showing that there were deposits of $1.116 trillion and loans of $693 billion).
JPMorgan, Current Report (Form 8-K), at 3 (July 13, 2012).
47
See Agustino Fontevecchia, Dimon’s Volcker Rule Contradiction: On Hedging, Prop Trading, and
the
London
Whale,
FORBES.COM
(June
13,
2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2012/06/13/dimons-volcker-rule-contradiction-on-hedgingprop-trading-and-the-london-whale/.
48
See supra text accompanying notes 1–3.
49
See The Path to Job Creation: The State of American Small Business: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. On Small Bus., 112th Cong. 7–9 (2012) (statement of Martin Neil Baily, Senior Fellow, The
Brookings Institution), available at http://congressional.proquest.com.ezpprod1.hul.harvard.edu/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-2012-smb-0001?accountid=11311.
50
Cf. Yeon-Koo Che & Rajiv Sethi, Economic Consequences of Speculative Side Bets: The Case of
Naked CDS, VOX (Sept. 4, 2010), http://www.voxeu.org/article/economic-consequences-speculative-sidebets-case-naked-cds.
46
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Conclusion
Unfortunately, as Dominic Barton observed, our focus on short-term profits
instead of long-term planning is a substantial barrier to long-term growth. 51 The issue of
CDSs needs to be examined in light of how these instruments add or detract from our
overall long-term prosperity.

51

See Barton, supra note 4, at 86–88.
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